BRENT $100.71 ▲3.6% GAS $4.2245 DIESEL $5.94 ▲ RECORD SPR 286.6M DISTILLATES 104.2M CRISIS DAY 193
Strait of Hormuz, day —. Brent is back above $100, US diesel has set an all-time record, and the Strategic Petroleum Reserve has fallen from 415.4 million barrels to 286.6 million in six months. The depletion model's question: at the current draw rate, how much buffer is left before the corridor breaks — and what does each branch cost?
Crisis day — · model day— · data as of 2026-09-09 · scenario model, not a forecast
Brent
$100.71
Sep 9 settle · first >$100 since Jul 24 · +32% vs pre-crisis ~$76
US diesel (AAA)
$5.94
Sep 9 · all-time record (Jun 2022 record broken Sep 4) · +60% vs pre-war $3.72
US gasoline (AAA)
$4.22
Sep 9 · highest Labor Day ever · +50% vs Jan $2.81
SPR
286.6M
w/e Aug 28 · −128.8M since pre-war 415.4M · lowest since Dec 1982
US distillates
104.2M
w/e Aug 28 · −14% vs 5-yr avg · PADD1 −27% YoY — the binding constraint
Likely outcomes
10 / 50 / 40
corridor holds / standoff drift / corridor lapses (Sep 9 reweight)
monthly avgs — Mar $103.0 (EIA) · Apr $117.29 (STEO) · Jul $83.76 (STEO)
Observed points only — hollow markers are a source's rounded estimate, not a measured close. The path: $76 before the closure → $126 intraday peak (March, +65% — the largest monthly rise in oil-market history) → $95 by mid-April on ceasefire hopes → $74 on Jun 30 → back through $100 on Sep 9 as the tanker war took hold.
EIA weekly, national
From $2.81 in January to $4.22 now — +50%, with the May peak at $4.50. Every month of 2026 since March has averaged above pre-crisis levels.
AAA national, sourced points
From $3.52 in January to an all-time record $5.94 on Sep 9 — +68%. The old record (June 2022, ≈$5.85) fell on Sep 4. Diesel leads gasoline: product, not crude, is the scarce thing.
EIA weekly ending stocks, million bbl
The red lines are floors, not forecasts: ~300M is the cavern-damage threshold — below it the caverns cannot safely be refilled after a draw (breached Aug 14). 250M is the GEF operational minimum for a sustained draw, 180M the hard operable limit, and 70M the DOE's stated safe minimum — the draw stops there, it does not continue. The dashed paths project three draw rates from the Aug 28 level out to ~March 2027: 0.45M b/d (corridor holds, ~205M by then), 0.70M b/d (standoff, reaches 250M in late October and ~160M by March), 1.35M b/d (corridor lapses, through 250M within a month and pinned at the 70M floor from ~Feb 2027).
SPR
286.6M bbl
−128.8M (−31%) since pre-war 415.4M
lowest since Dec 1982
US distillates
104.2M bbl
−14% vs 5-yr avg (121.2M)
PADD1 −27% YoY — the binding constraint
US crude
424.5M bbl
+1% vs 5-yr avg (420.3M)
products, not crude, are the scarce thing
Global inventories
−400M bbl YTD
STEO Sep 9 estimate
falling through end of 2026
The release began in earnest Apr 3 (413.3M) and ran fastest in May (≈1.2M b/d). The draw has slowed to ≈0.45M b/d — the corridor-holds pace — while distillates sit 14% below their 5-year average.
probability of each track — reweighted only on regime events
regime event: 10 tankers/week + $100 + Jazan
regime event: exclusion zone + first third-country base hit
post-8.6M-claim bust
original model (de-escalation 65%) — approx
Corridor holds
10%
Transit resumes under some regime — an Iran–Oman safe corridor or US-escorted lanes — and Hormuz trends back toward normal over one to two quarters.
Brent mean-reverts toward $70–80; the SPR draw slows to ~0.45M b/d and the depletion timeline stretches out again.
Standoff drift
50%
The war continues at current intensity — periodic tanker strikes, the exclusion zone holding, Iranian infrastructure partially offline — but no sustained closure.
Brent ranges $95–125; the SPR draws ~0.70M b/d; global stocks keep falling; the breaking-points cascade is delayed, not cancelled.
Corridor lapses
40%
Sustained closure or escalation — tanker losses spike, the exclusion zone hardens into permanence, Abqaiq and Jazan stay offline for months.
Brent $130+; the SPR draws 1.35M b/d and the inventory cascade begins (PADD1 → Russia → ARA → China → jet fuel).
How these odds are set. They are judgment priors, not a forecast — revised only on regime events: verified structural changes (tanker-loss spikes, exclusion-zone enforcement, Iranian infrastructure offline, diplomatic breaks), never on daily price noise. On Sep 9 the weights moved from 15/55/30 to 10/50/40 on the week's tanker losses (10 ships), the exclusion zone being enforced, the first strike on a third-country base, and the Jazan hit. A data check runs alongside the judgment: branch_filter.py in the model directory is a three-state Bayesian filter — weekly verified transits and tanker losses (Poisson) plus Brent (Normal) feed a transition matrix that outputs horizon weights. On Sep 9 it said 14.9 / 49.8 / 35.3 against judgment's 10 / 50 / 40; v1 has no trend memory, so that gap is logged, not averaged in.
What would move them. A verified corridor re-opening (IMO filing, sustained transits ≥40% of the 85/day baseline for two consecutive weeks) or a durable ceasefire shifts weight toward holds. Tanker losses above ~15/week, a Jazan or Abqaiq restart slipping, the Russia product-ban expiry on Sep 30, a widening EIA–market spread (STEO has 2H26 at ~$90 while spot is over $100 — a gap beyond ~$10–15 means the market is pricing lapse above 40%), or an adverse Polymarket settlement on Sep 14/30 shifts weight toward lapses. Between regime events, the weights hold — a quiet week is not evidence.
key events, as verified in the research logs
| 2026-09-09 | STEO: 2H26 ~$90 / 2027 $74. Brent breaks $100 ($100.71, high $101.25). Novorossiysk drone strike. 32 Saudi airstrikes on Yemen |
| 2026-09-08 | Jazan hit (400 kb/d — offline since at least late July); diesel $5.90 record |
| 2026-09-07 | Regime event: exclusion zone enforced; first strike on a third-country base (Jordan) |
| 2026-09-04 | 10 tankers lost in a week; US retail diesel $5.85 — all-time record |
| 2026-09-02 | US strikes Iranian tankers for the first time; 80 AIS-dark tankers in 24h |
| 2026-08-31 | Kpler claims 8.6M bpd through Hormuz; two supertankers struck — the claim does not hold up |
| 2026-08-29 | Russia: >30% of actual refining capacity knocked out; product export ban extended to Sep 30 |
| 2026-08-28 | WPSR: SPR 286.6M — lowest since Dec 1982; drawing ~0.45M b/d |
| 2026-08-23 | PortWatch: 3 vessels through Hormuz = 4% of the 85/day baseline |
| 2026-08-21 | US distillates 103.4M — record seasonal low, ~14% below 5-yr avg |
| 2026-08-19 | US claims 'controlling the southern lane' (Axios) — the lane is contested, not controlled |
| 2026-08-14 | SPR breaks below the ~300M cavern-damage floor (293.4M) |
| 2026-07-27 | Abqaiq halted (~7M bpd of processing) |
| 2026-06-30 | Day 1 of the depletion model — Brent $74 called a 'false signal'; Hormuz ~5% of normal traffic |
| 2026-05 | Gulf export shut-in peaks at 11.2M bpd; US diesel peaks $5.60 (May) |
| 2026-04 | April monthly avg $117.29 (STEO); mid-April ceasefire hopes pull the settle to $95.48 (Apr 20) |
| 2026-03-30 | Consumer prices turn: gasoline $4.11, diesel $5.62 (AAA) — +38% / +49% in a month |
| 2026-03-18 | Brent intraday peak $126 — March closes +65%, the largest monthly rise in oil-market history |
| 2026-03-11 | IEA 172M-bbl coordinated release authorized (~120 days; ends ~early July) |
| 2026-03-08 | Brent above $100 for the first time in four years |
| 2026-03-04 | Iran declares the Strait of Hormuz closed |
| 2026-02-28 | War begins: strikes on Gulf energy infrastructure start — ACLED damage inventory runs from Feb 28 (172+ non-military strikes, 48% energy/power/desal); IEA counts ~1.3B bbl of supply loss from February |
dated events the model is watching
Sep 10
WPSR (w/e Sep 5) — distillate sub-100M breach? SPR draw pace after the escalation
the leading indicator
Sep 10
August PPI — consensus 5.4% vs 4.7% prior
macro tripwire
Sep 14/15
Polymarket 'Hormuz normal by Sep 30' settles (3.8%)
expected ~0
Sep 30
Russia diesel export ban expiry (T-21) · Polymarket Sep 30 settlements · Swedish petrol excise cut expires
three dated events in one week
Oct 7
Next STEO — the first one that actually prices the tanker war + Jazan + exclusion zone
the real test of EIA's 'constraints, not closure'
Nov 30
Russian jet-fuel export ban
jet fuel cascade
§11, compressed twice
PADD1 (US East Coast)
Sep 14–21
distillate days-of-cover collapse; −27% YoY already
Russia
Sep 30
diesel export ban expiry — consequence of >30% capacity loss, not policy choice
ARA (Europe)
Early Oct
gasoil trader floor 8.5–9M bbl; mid-Oct in the lapse branch
China
~Oct 10–17
buffer drawdown accelerates
Europe (visible)
~Oct 25–30
shortages expected mid/late October — price-triggered political breaks first
Jet fuel
Nov 10–30
Russia jet export ban (Nov 30) + 45.7M bbl / ~26 days cover
local-only files (research/), not published
| 2026-09-09 | Full pass: STEO, Russia/Red Sea deep-dive, regime reweight 10/50/40, literature survey, model scripts (draw_rate / elasticity / branch_filter) |
| 2026-09-08 | Jazan + diesel record (backfilled) |
| 2026-09-07 | Regime event #1 — exclusion zone, Jordan strike (backfilled) |
| 2026-09-06 | OPEC+ ministerial, OMR (backfilled) |
| 2026-09-02 | First US strike on Iranian tankers (backfilled) |
| 2026-08-30 | Traffic claims vs verified transits (backfilled) |
| 2026-08-29 | WPSR week + Russia deep-dive (backfilled) |
| 2026-08-19 | 14-day deep-dive sweep, Aug 19 – Sep 2 (backfilled) |
| 2026-06-30 | Day 1 — model established (backfilled) |